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Constrained Consensus for Bargaining in Dynamic Coalitional TU
Games
Angelia Nedic´ and Dario Bauso
Abstract—We consider a sequence of transferable utility
(TU) games where, at each time, the characteristic function
is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set
of values. We assume that the players in the game interact
only with their neighbors, where the neighbors may vary
over time. The game differs from other ones in the literature
on dynamic, stochastic or interval valued TU games as it
combines dynamics of the game with an allocation protocol
for the players that dynamically interact with each other. The
protocol is an iterative and decentralized algorithm that offers
a paradigmatic mathematical description of negotiation and
bargaining processes. The main contributions of the paper
are the definition of a robust (coalitional) TU game and the
development of a distributed bargaining protocol. We prove the
convergence with probability 1 of the bargaining protocol to a
random allocation that lies in the core of the robust game under
some mild conditions on the players’ communication graphs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU) have
been introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern [24].
They have been used to model cooperation in supply chain or
inventory management applications [6], [10], network flow
applications [2] and in communication networks [20].
In this paper, we consider a sequence of coalitional TU
games for a finite set of players. The game is played
repeatedly over time, thus generating a sequence of time
varying characteristic functions. We refer to such a repeated
game as dynamic coalitional TU game. In this setting, a
player can observe only the allocations of his neighbors,
which may change in time. The model used in the current
paper is motivated by applications in the context of network
flow problems and multi-inventory control as illustrated in
[3], [4].
We consider bargaining protocols assuming that each
player i obeys rationality and efficiency by deciding on
an allocation vector which satisfies the value constraints of
all the coalitions that include player i. This set is termed
bounding set of player i. At every iteration, a player i
observes the allocations of some of his neighbors. This is
modeled using a directed graph with the set of players as the
vertex set and a time-varying edge set composed of directed
links (i, j) whenever player i observes the allocation vector
proposed by player j at time t. We refer to this directed
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graph as players’ neighbor-graph. Given a player’s neighbor-
graph, each player i negotiates allocations by adjusting the
allocations he received from his neighbors through weight
assignments. As the balanced allocation may violate his
rationality constraints (it lies outside player i’s bounding set),
the player selects a new allocation by projecting the balanced
allocation on his bounding set. We propose such bargaining
protocols for solving the robust TU game. We use some mild
assumptions on the connectivity of the players’ neighbor-
graph and the weights that the players use when balancing
their own allocations with the neighbors’ allocations. Assum-
ing that the core of the robust game is nonempty, we show
that our bargaining protocol converges with probability 1 to
a common (random) allocation in the core.
The work in this paper deviate from the stochastic frame-
work provided in [9], [21], [22] in at least three aspects: i)
the existence of a neighbor-graph, ii) the presence of multiple
iterations in the bargaining process, iii) and the consideration
of the robust game. Also, a new element with respect to
previous work [8], [11], is that the values of the coalitions
are realized exogenously and no relation is assumed between
consecutive samples.
Dynamic robust TU games have been considered in [3]
and [4] but for a continuous time setting in the former work
and for a centralized allocation process in the latter one.
Convergence of allocation processes is a main topic also
in [5], [13]. The difference with our approach is that in [5],
[13], rewards are allocated by a game designer repeatedly in
a centralized manner. Convergence of bargaining processes
has also been explored under dynamic coalition formation [1]
for a different dynamic model, where players decide both on
which coalition to address and what payoff to announce.
The work in this paper is also related to the literature
on agreement among multiple agents, where an underlying
communication graph for the agents and balancing weights
have been used with some variations [23], [15] to reach an
agreement on common decision variable, as well as in [16],
[17], [19], [18] for distributed multi-agent optimization.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
introduce the dynamic TU game, the robust game and
the bargaining protocol for this game. We then give some
preliminary results. In Section III, we prove the convergence
of the bargaining protocol to a point in the core of the robust
game with probability 1. In Section IV, we report some
numerical simulations to illustrate our theoretical study, and
we conclude in Section V.
Notation. We view vectors as columns. For a vector x, we
use xi or [x]i to denote its ith coordinate component. We
also use xi to denote the vector associated to player i. For
two vectors x and y, we use x < y (x ≤ y) to denote xi <
yi (xi ≤ yi) for all coordinate indices i. We let x
′ denote
the transpose of a vector x, and ‖x‖ denote its Euclidean
norm. An n × n matrix A is row-stochastic if the matrix
has nonnegative entries aij and
∑n
j=1 aij = 1 for all i =
1, . . . , n. For a matrix A, we use aij or [A]ij to denote its
ijth entry. A matrix A is doubly stochastic if both A and
its transpose A′ are row-stochastic. Given two sets U and S,
we write U ⊂ S to denote that U is a proper subset of S.
We use |S| for the cardinality of a given finite set S.
We write PX [x] to denote the projection of a vector x on
a set X , and we write dist(x,X) for the distance from x
to X , i.e., PX [x] = argminy∈X ‖x − y‖ and dist(x,X) =
‖x−PX [x]‖, respectively. Given a set X and a scalar λ ∈ R,
the set λX is defined by λX , {λx | x ∈ X}. Given two
sets X,Y ⊆ Rn, the set sum X +Y is defined by X +Y ,
{x + y | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y }. Given a set N of players and
a function η : S 7→ R defined for each nonempty coalition
S ⊆ N , we write < N, η > to denote the transferable utility
(TU) game with the players’ set N and the characteristic
function η. We let ηS be the value η(S) of the characteristic
function η associated with a nonempty coalition S ⊆ N .
Given a TU game < N, η >, we use C(η) to denote the
core of the game,
C(η) =
{
x
∣∣∣ ∑
i∈N
xi = ηN ,
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ ηS for all S ⊂ N
}
,
where S is always considered to be non-empty.
II. DYNAMIC TU GAME AND ROBUST GAME
In this section, we formulate a robust dynamic TU game
and introduce a bargaining protocol that the players imple-
ment to reach an agreement on their allocations. We also
provide some preliminary results for the protocol.
A. Problem Formulation and Bargaining Process
Consider a set of players N = {1, . . . , n} and the set of
all possible (nonempty) coalitions S ⊆ N among them. Let
m = 2n−1 be the number of possible coalitions. We assume
that time is discrete and use t = 0, 1, 2, . . . to index the time.
We consider a dynamic TU game, denoted < N, {v(t)} >,
where {v(t)} is a sequence of characteristic functions. In this
game, the players are involved in a sequence of instantaneous
TU games whereby, at each time t, the instantaneous TU
game is < N, v(t) > with v(t) ∈ Rm for all t ≥ 0.
Further, we let vS(t) denote the value assigned to a nonempty
coalition S ⊆ N in the instantaneous game < N, v(t) >.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we assume that S 6= ∅,
i.e., we do not consider empty coalitions.
In what follows, we deal with dynamic TU games where
each characteristic function v(t) is a random vector with
realizations restricted to some set of values. Specifically, we
assume that the grand coalition value vN (t) is deterministic
for every t ≥ 0, while the values vS(t) of the other coalitions
S ⊂ N have a common upper bound. These conditions are
formally stated in the following assumption.
Assumption 1: There exists vmax ∈ Rm such that for all
t ≥ 0,
vN (t) = v
max
N ,
vS(t) ≤ v
max
S for all coalitions S ⊂ N.
We refer to the game < N, vmax > as robust game. We
assume that the robust game has a nonempty core.
Assumption 2: The core C(vmax) is not empty.
An immediate consequence of Assumptions 1 and 2 is
that the core C(v(t)) of the instantaneous game is always
not empty. This follows from the fact that C(vmax) ⊆ C(η)
for any η satisfying ηN = v
max
N and ηS ≤ v
max
S for S ⊂ N ,
and the assumption that the core C(vmax) is not empty.
We assume that each player i is rational and efficient. This
translates to each player i ∈ N choosing his allocation vector
within the set of allocations satisfying value constraints of
all coalitions that include player i. This set is referred to as
the bounding set of player i. For a generic game < N, η >,
it is given by
Xi(η) =

x ∈ Rn |
∑
j∈N
xj = ηN ,
∑
j∈S
xj ≥ ηS
for all S ⊂ N s.t. i ∈ S} .
Note that each Xi(η) is polyhedral.
In what follows, we find it convenient to represent the
bounding sets and the core in alternative equivalent forms.
For each coalition S ⊆ N , let eS ∈ R
n be the incidence
vector for S, i.e., the vector with the coordinates given by
[eS ]i =
{
1 if i ∈ S,
0 else.
Then, the bounding sets and the core are given by
Xi(η) = {x ∈ R
n | e′Nx = ηN , e
′
Sx ≥ ηS (1)
for all S ⊂ N with i ∈ S},
C(η) = {x ∈ Rn | e′Nx = ηN , e
′
Sx ≥ ηS (2)
for all S ⊂ N}.
Observe that the core C(η) of the game < N, η > is the
intersection of the bounding sets Xi(η) of the players, i.e.,
C(η) = ∩ni=1Xi(η). (3)
We now discuss the bargaining protocol where repeatedly
over time each player i ∈ N proposes an allocation vector.
The allocation vector proposed by player i at time t is
denoted by xi(t) ∈ Rn, where the jth component xij(t) rep-
resents the amount that player i would allocate to player j. To
simplify the notation in the dynamic game < N, {v(t)} >,
we let Xi(t) denote the bounding set of player i for the
instantaneous game < N, v(t) >, i.e., for all i ∈ N and
t ≥ 0,
Xi(t) = {x ∈ R
n | e′Nx = vN (t), e
′
Sx ≥ vS(t) (4)
for all S ⊂ N with i ∈ S} .
Now, we focus on players interactions in time. We assume
that each player may observe the allocations of a subset of the
other players at any time, which are termed as the neighbors
of the player. The players and their neighbors at time t can
be represented by a directed graph G(t) = (N, E(t)), with
the vertex set N and the set E(t) of directed links. A link
(i, j) ∈ E(t) exists if player j is a neighbor of player i
at time t. We always assume that (i, i) ∈ E(t) for all t,
which is natural since every player i can always access its
own allocation vector. We refer to graph G(t) as a neighbor-
graph at time t. In the graph G(t), a player j is a neighbor
of player i (i.e., (i, j) ∈ E(t)) only if player i can observe
the allocation vector of player j at time t.
Given the players’ neighbor-graph G(t), each player i
negotiates allocations by averaging his allocation and his
neighbors’ allocations. More precisely, at time t, the bargain-
ing process for each player i involves the player’s individual
bounding set Xi(t), its own allocation x
i(t) and the observed
allocations xj(t) of some of his neighbors j. Formally, we let
Ni(t) be the set of neighbors of player i at time t (including
himself), i.e.,
Ni(t) = {j ∈ N | (i, j) ∈ E(t)}.
With this notation, the bargaining process is given by:
xi(t+1) = PXi(t)

 ∑
j∈Ni(t)
aij(t)x
j(t)

 ∀i ∈ N, t ≥ 0 (5)
where aij(t) ≥ 0 is a scalar weight that player i assigns
to the proposed allocation xj(t) of player j and PXi(t)[·]
is the projection onto the player i bounding set Xi(t). The
initial allocations xi(0), i ∈ N, are selected randomly and
independently of {v(t)}.
The bargaining in (5) can be written more compactly by
introducing zero weights for players j whose allocations are
not available to player i at time t. Specifically by defining
aij(t) = 0 for all j 6∈ Ni(t) and t ≥ 0, we have the following
equivalent representation of the bargaining protocol:
xi(t+ 1) = PXi(t)

 n∑
j=1
aij(t)x
j(t)

 ∀i ∈ N, t ≥ 0. (6)
Here, aij(t) = 0 for j 6∈ Ni(t) and aij(t) ≥ 0 for j ∈ Ni(t).
We now discuss the specific assumptions on the weights
aij(t) and the players’ neighbor-graph that we will rely on.
We let A(t) be the weight matrix with entries aij(t). We
will use the following assumption for the weight matrices.
Assumption 3: Each matrix A(t) is doubly stochastic with
positive diagonal, and there exists a scalar α > 0 such that
aij(t) ≥ α whenever aij(t) > 0.
In view of the construction of matrices A(t), we see that
aij(t) ≥ α for j = i and perhaps for some players j that
are neighbors of player i. The requirement that the positive
weights are uniformly bounded away from zero is imposed
to ensure that the information from each player diffuses
to his neighbors in the network persistently in time. The
requirement on the doubly stochasticity of the weights is used
to ensure that in a long run each player has equal influence
on the limiting allocation vector.
It is natural to expect that the connectivity of the players’
neighbor-graphs G(t) = (N, E(t)) impacts the bargaining
process. At any time, the instantaneous graph G(t) need
not be connected. However, for the proper behavior of the
bargaining process, the union of the graphs G(t) over a period
of time is assumed to be connected.
Assumption 4: There is an integer Q ≥ 1 such that the
graph
(
N,
⋃(t+1)Q−1
τ=tQ E(τ)
)
is strongly connected for every
t ≥ 0.
Assumptions 3 and 4 together guarantee that the players
communicate sufficiently often to ensure that the information
of each player is persistently diffused over the network in
time to reach every other player. Under these assumptions,
we will study the dynamic bargaining process in (6). We want
to provide conditions under which the process converges to
an allocation in the core of the robust game. Before this, we
provide some preliminary results in the following section.
B. Preliminary Results
In this section we derive some preliminary results pertinent
to the core of the robust game. We also provide some
error bounds for polyhedral sets applicable to the players’
bounding sets Xi(t). We later use these results to establish
the convergence of the bargaining process in (6).
In our analysis we often use the following relation that
holds for the projection operation on a closed convex set
X ⊆ Rn: for any w ∈ Rn and any x ∈ X ,
‖PX [w]− x‖
2 ≤ ‖w − x‖2 − ‖PX [w]− w‖
2. (7)
This relation is known as a strictly non-expansive projection
property (see [7], volume II, 12.1.13 Lemma, page 1120).
We next relate the distance dist(x,C(η)) from a point x
to the core C(η) with the distances dist(x,Xi(η)) from x to
the bounding sets Xi(η). To do so, we use the polyhedrality
of the bounding sets Xi(η) and the core C(η), as given in (1)
and (2) respectively, and a special relation for polyhedral sets.
This special relation states that for a nonempty polyhedral
set P = {x ∈ Rn | a′ℓx ≤ bℓ, ℓ = 1, . . . , r}, there exists a
scalar c > 0 such that
dist(x,P) ≤ c
r∑
ℓ=1
dist(x,Hℓ) for all x ∈ R
n, (8)
where Hℓ = {x ∈ R
n | a′ℓx ≤ bℓ} and the scalar c depends
only on the vectors aℓ, ℓ = 1, . . . , r. Relation (8) is known as
Hoffman bound, as it has been established by Hoffman [12]
Aside from the Hoffman bound, in establishing the forth-
coming Lemma 1, we also use the fact that the square
distance from a point x to a closed convex set X contained
in an affine set H is given by
dist2(x,X) = ‖x− PH [x]‖
2 + dist2(PH [x], X). (9)
Now, we are ready to present the result relating the values
dist2(x,C(η)) and dist2(x,Xi(η)).
Lemma 1: Let < N, η > be a TU game with a nonempty
core C(η). Then, there is a constant µ > 0 such that
dist2(x,C(η)) ≤ µ
n∑
i=1
dist2(x,Xi(η)) for all x ∈ R
n,
where µ depends on the collection of vectors {e˜S | S ⊂
N, S 6= ∅}, where each e˜S is the projection of eS on the
hyperplane H = {x ∈ Rn | e′Nx = ηN}.
Proof: Since the hyperplane H contains the core C(η)
(see (2)), by relation (9) we have for all x ∈ Rn,
dist2(x,C(η)) = ‖x− PH [x]‖
2 + dist2(PH [x], C(η)). (10)
The point PH [x] and the core C(η) lie in the hyperplane H
(an n− 1-dimensional affine set). By applying the Hoffman
bound relative to the affine set H (cf. Eq. (8)), we obtain
dist(PH [x], C(η)) ≤ c
∑
S⊂N
dist(PH [x], H ∩HS),
where HS = {x ∈ R
n | e′Sx ≥ ηS}, while the constant
c depends on the collection {e˜S , S ⊂ N} of projections of
vectors eS on the hyperplane H for S ⊂ N . Thus, it follows
dist2(PH [x], C(η)) ≤ c
2
(∑
S⊂N
dist(PH [x], H ∩HS)
)2
≤ c2(m− 1)
∑
S⊂N
dist2(PH [x], H ∩HS), (11)
where m is the number of nonempty subsets of N , and the
last inequality follows by (
∑ℓ
j=1 aj)
2 ≤ ℓ
∑ℓ
j=1 a
2
j , which
holds for any set of scalars {aj , j = 1, . . . , ℓ} with ℓ ≥ 1.
From Eqs. (10) and (11), we obtain for all x ∈ Rn,
dist2(x,C(η)) ≤ ‖x− PH [x]‖
2
+ c2(m− 1)
∑
S⊂N
dist2(PH [x], H ∩HS)
≤ c1
∑
S⊂N
(
‖x− PH [x]‖
2
+ dist2(PH [x], H ∩HS)
)
,
where c1 = max{1, c
2(m− 1)}. Since the set H is affine,
by Eq. (9) we have ‖x−PH [x]‖
2+dist2(PH [x], H∩HS) =
dist2(x,H ∩HS), implying that for all x ∈ R
n,
dist2(x,C(η)) ≤ c1
∑
S⊂N
dist2(x,H ∩HS).
From the preceding relation, it follows for all x ∈ Rn,
dist2(x,C(η)) ≤ c1
∑
S⊂N
|S|dist2(x,H ∩HS), (12)
where |S| is the cardinality of coalition S. Note that∑
S⊂N
|S|dist2(x,H ∩HS)
=
∑
S⊂N
∑
i∈S
dist2(x,H ∩HS)
=
n∑
i=1

 ∑
{S⊂N |i∈S}
dist2(x,H ∩HS)

 . (13)
We also note that Xi(η) ⊂ H ∩ HS for each S ⊂ N with
i ∈ S, which follows by the definition ofHS and relation (1).
For any two closed convex setsX,Y ⊆ Rn such thatX ⊂ Y ,
we have dist(x, Y ) ≤ dist(x,X) for any x ∈ Rn. Thus,
since Xi(η) ⊂ H ∩ HS for each S with i ∈ S, it follows
that for all x ∈ Rn,
dist(x,H ∩HS) ≤ dist(x,Xi(η)). (14)
By combining Eqs. (12)–(14) we obtain for all x ∈ Rn,
dist2(x,C(η)) ≤ c1
n∑
i=1

 ∑
{S⊂N |i∈S}
dist2(x,Xi(η))


= c1κ
n∑
i=1
dist2(x,Xi(η)),
where κ is the number of coalitions S that contain player
i, which is the same number for every player (κ does not
depend on i). The desired relation follows by letting µ = c1κ,
and by recalling that c1 = max{1, c
2(m − 1)} and that c
depends on the projections e˜S of vectors eS , S ⊂ N , on the
hyperplane H .
Note that the scalar µ in Lemma 1 does not depend on
the coalitions’ values ηS for S 6= N . It depends only on the
vectors eS , S ⊆ N , and the grand coalition value ηN .
As a direct consequence of Lemma 1, we have the
following result for the instantaneous game < N, v(t) >
under the assumptions of Section II-A.
Lemma 2: Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. We then have
for all x ∈ Rn and all t ≥ 0,
dist2(x,C(v(t))) ≤ µ
n∑
i=1
dist2(x,Xi(t)),
where C(v(t)) is the core of the game < N, v(t) >, Xi(t)
is the bounding set of player i, and µ is the constant from
Lemma 1.
Proof: By Assumption 2, we have that the core
C(vmax) is nonempty. Furthermore, under Assumption 1,
we have C(vmax) ⊆ C(v(t)) for all t ≥ 0, implying that the
core C(v(t)) is nonempty for all t ≥ 0.
Under Assumption 1, each core C(v(t)) is defined by the
same affine equality corresponding to the grand coalition
value, e′Nx = v
max
N . Moreover, each core C(v(t)) is defined
through the set of hyperplanes HS(t) = {x ∈ R
n | e′Sx ≥
vS(t)}, S ⊂ N , which have time invariant normal vectors
eS , S ⊆ N . Thus, the result follows from Lemma 1.
III. CONVERGENCE TO CORE OF ROBUST GAME
In this section, we prove convergence of the bargaining
process in (6) to a random allocation in the core of the robust
game with probability 1. We find it convenient to re-write
bargaining protocol (6) by isolating a linear and a non-linear
term. The linear term is the vector wi(t) defined as:
wi(t) =
n∑
j=1
aij(t)x
j(t) for all i ∈ N and t ≥ 0. (15)
Note that wi(t) is linear in players’ allocations xj(t). The
non-linear term is the error
ei(t) = PXi(t)[w
i(t)]− wi(t). (16)
Using (15) and (16), we can rewrite protocol (6) as follows:
xi(t+1) = wi(t)+ei(t) for all i ∈ N and t ≥ 0. (17)
Recall that the weights aij(t) ≥ 0 are such that aij(t) = 0
for all j 6∈ Ni(t). Also, recall that A(t) is the matrix with
entries aij(t), which defines the vectors w
i(t) in (15).
In what follows we will show that, with probability 1,
bargaining protocol (15)–(17) converges to the core C(vmax)
of the robust game < N, vmax >, provided that v(t) =
vmax happens infinitely often in time with probability 1.
To establish this we use some auxiliary results, which we
develop in the next two lemmas.
The following lemma provides a result on the sequences
xi(t) and shows that the errors ei(t) are diminishing.
Lemma 3: Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Also, assume
that each matrix A(t) is doubly stochastic. Then, for bar-
gaining protocol (15)–(17), we have
(a)
{∑n
i=1 ‖x
i(t)− x‖2
}
converges for all x ∈ C(vmax).
(b)
∑∞
t=0
∑n
j=1 ‖e
i(t)‖2 < ∞ and limt→∞ ‖e
i(t)‖ = 0
for all i ∈ N .
Proof: By xi(t+1) = PXi(t)[w
i(t)] and by strictly non-
expansive property of the Euclidean projection on a closed
convex set Xi(t) (see (7)), we have for all i ∈ N , t ≥ 0 and
x ∈ Xi(t),
‖xi(t+ 1)− x‖2 ≤ ‖wi(t)− x‖2 − ‖ei(t)‖2. (18)
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the core C(vmax) is con-
tained in the core C(v(t)) for all t ≥ 0, implying that
C(vmax) ⊆ C(v(t)) for all t ≥ 0. Furthermore, since
C(v(t)) = ∩ni=1Xi(t), it follows that C(v
max) ⊆ Xi(t) for
all i ∈ N and t ≥ 0. Therefore, relation (18) holds for all
x ∈ C(vmax). Thus, by summing the relations in (18) over
i ∈ N , we obtain for all t ≥ 0 and x ∈ C(vmax),
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t+1)−x‖2 ≤
n∑
i=1
‖wi(t)−x‖2−
n∑
i=1
‖ei(t)‖2. (19)
By the definition of wi(t) in (15), using the stochasticity of
A(t) and the convexity of the squared norm, we obtain
n∑
i=1
‖wi(t)− x‖2 =
n∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
j=1
aij(t)x
j(t)− x
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤
n∑
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
aij(t)
)
‖xj(t)− x‖2.
By the doubly stochasticity of A(t), we have
∑n
i=1 aij(t) =
1 for every j, implying
∑n
i=1 ‖w
i(t)−x‖2 ≤
∑n
i=1 ‖x
i(t)−
x‖2. By substituting this relation in (19), we arrive at
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t+1)−x‖2 ≤
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t)−x‖2−
n∑
i=1
‖ei(t)‖2. (20)
The preceding relation shows that the scalar sequence
{
∑n
i=1 ‖x
i(t) − x‖2} is non-increasing for any given x ∈
C(vmax). Therefore, the sequence must be convergent since
it is nonnegative. Moreover, by summing the relations in (20)
over t = 0, . . . , s and then, letting s→∞, we obtain
∞∑
t=0
n∑
i=1
‖ei(t)‖2 ≤
n∑
i=1
‖xi(0)− x‖2,
which implies that limt→∞ e
i(t) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
In our next result, we will use the instantaneous average
of players allocations, defined as follows:
y(t) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
xj(t) for all t ≥ 0.
The result shows that the difference between the bargaining
payoff vector xi(t) for any player i and the average y(t)
of these payoffs converges to 0 as time goes to infinity.
The proof essentially uses the line of analysis that has
been employed in [17], where the sets Xi(t) are static, i.e.,
Xi(t) = Xi for all t. In addition, we also use the rate result
for doubly stochastic matrices, as established in [15].
Lemma 4: Let Assumptions 3 and 4 hold. Suppose that
for the bargaining protocol (15)–(17) we have
lim
t→∞
‖ei(t)‖ = 0 for all i ∈ N.
Then, for every player i ∈ N we have
lim
t→∞
‖xi(t)− y(t)‖ = 0, lim
t→∞
‖wi(t)− y(t)‖ = 0.
Proof: For any t ≥ s ≥ 0, define matrices
Φ(t, s) = A(t)A(t− 1) · · ·A(s+ 1)A(s),
with Φ(t, t) = A(t). Using the matrices Φ(t, s) and the
expression for xi(t) in (17), we relate xi(t) with xi(s) at
a time s for 0 ≤ s ≤ t− 1, as follows:
xi(t) =
n∑
j=1
[Φ(t− 1, s)]ij x
j(s) (21)
+
t−1∑
r=s+1

 n∑
j=1
[Φ(t− 1, r)]ij e
j(r − 1)

+ ei(t− 1).
Using the doubly stochasticity of A(t), y(t) = 1
n
∑n
j=1 x
j(t)
and relation (21), we obtain for all t ≥ s ≥ 0,
y(t) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
xj(s) +
1
n
t∑
r=s+1

 n∑
j=1
ej(r − 1)

 . (22)
By our assumption, we have limt→∞ ‖e
i(t)‖ = 0 for all i.
Thus, for any ǫ > 0, there is an integer sˆ ≥ 0 such that
‖ei(t)‖ ≤ ǫ for all t ≥ sˆ and all i. Using relations (21)
and (22) with s = sˆ, we obtain for all i and t ≥ sˆ+ 1,
‖xi(t)− y(t)‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
j=1
(
[Φ(t− 1, sˆ)]ij −
1
n
)
xj(sˆ)
+
t−1∑
r=sˆ+1
n∑
j=1
(
[Φ(t− 1, r)]ij −
1
n
)
ej(r − 1)
+
(
ei(t− 1)−
1
n
n∑
j=1
ej(t− 1)
)∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤
n∑
j=1
∣∣∣[Φ(t− 1, sˆ)]ij − 1
n
∣∣∣ ‖xj(sˆ)‖
+
t−1∑
r=sˆ+1
n∑
j=1
∣∣∣[Φ(t− 1, r)]ij − 1
n
∣∣∣‖ej(r − 1)‖
+ ‖ei(t− 1)‖+
1
n
n∑
j=1
‖ej(t− 1)‖.
Since ‖ei(t)‖ ≤ ǫ for all t ≥ sˆ and all i, it follows that
‖xi(t)− y(t)‖ ≤
n∑
j=1
∣∣∣[Φ(t− 1, sˆ)]ij − 1
n
∣∣∣ ‖xj(sˆ)‖
+ǫ
t−1∑
r=sˆ+1
n∑
j=1
∣∣∣[Φ(t− 1, r)]ij − 1
n
∣∣∣ + 2ǫ.
Under Assumptions 3 and 4, the following result holds for
the matrices Φ(t, s), as shown in [14] (see there Corollary
1):∣∣∣∣[Φ(t, s)]ij − 1n
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (1− α4n2
)⌈ t−s+1Q ⌉−2
for all t ≥ s ≥ 0.
Substituting the preceding estimate in the estimate for
‖xi(t)− y(t)‖, we obtain
‖xi(t)− y(t)‖ ≤
(
1−
α
4n2
)⌈ t−sˆQ ⌉−2 n∑
j=1
‖xj(sˆ)‖
+nǫ
t−1∑
r=sˆ+1
(
1−
α
4n2
)⌈ t−rQ ⌉−2
+ 2ǫ.
Letting t→∞, we see that
lim sup
t→∞
‖xi(t)− y(t)‖ ≤ nǫ
∞∑
r=sˆ+1
(
1−
α
4n2
)⌈ t−rQ ⌉−2
+2ǫ.
Note that
∑∞
r=sˆ+1
(
1− α4n2
)⌈ t−rQ ⌉−2 < ∞, which by the
arbitrary choice of ǫ yields
lim
t→∞
‖xi(t)− y(t)‖ = 0 for all i ∈ N.
Now, we focus on
∑n
i=1 ‖w
i(t) − y(t)‖. Since wi(t) =∑n
j=1 aij(t)x
j(t) and since A(t) is stochastic, it follows
n∑
i=1
‖wi(t)− y(t)‖ ≤
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aij(t)‖x
j(t)− y(t)‖.
Exchanging the order of the summations over, and then using
the doubly stochasticity of A(t), we have
n∑
i=1
‖wi(t)− y(t)‖ ≤
n∑
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
aij(t)
)
‖xj(t)− y(t)‖
=
n∑
j=1
‖xj(t)− y(t)‖.
Since limt→∞ ‖x
j(t) − y(t)‖ = 0 for all j, we have∑n
i=1 ‖w
i(t) − y(t)‖ → 0, implying ‖wi(t) − y(t)‖ → 0
for all i.
So far, the polyhedrality of the sets Xi(t) has not been
used. We now combine all pieces together, namely Lemma 2
that exploits the polyhedrality of the bounding sets Xi(t),
Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. This brings us to the following
convergence result for the robust game < N, vmax >.
Theorem 1: Let Assumptions 1–4 hold. Also, assume that
Prob {v(t) = vmax i.o.} = 1,
where i.o. stands for infinitely often. Then, the players
allocations xi(t) generated by bargaining protocol (15)–(17)
converge with probability 1 to an allocation in the core
C(vmax), i.e., there is a random vector x˜ ∈ C(vmax) such
that with probability 1,
lim
t→∞
‖xi(t)− x˜‖ = 0 for all i ∈ N.
Proof: By Lemma 3, the sequence {
∑n
i=1 ‖x
i(t)−x‖2}
is convergent for every x ∈ C(vmax) and the errors ei(t) are
diminishing for each player i, i.e., ‖ei(t)‖ → 0. Then, by
Lemma 4 we have ‖xi(t)− y(t)‖ → 0 for all i. Hence,
{‖y(t)− x‖} is convergent for every x ∈ C(vmax). (23)
We want to show that {y(t)} is convergent and that its limit
is in the core C(vmax) with probability 1. For this, we note
that since xi(t+ 1) ∈ Xi(t), it holds for all t ≥ 0,
n∑
i=1
dist2 (y(t+ 1), Xi(t)) ≤
n∑
i=1
‖y(t+ 1)− xi(t+ 1)‖2.
The preceding relation and ‖xi(t)−y(t)‖ → 0 for all i ∈ N
(cf. Lemma 4) imply
lim
t→∞
n∑
i=1
dist2 (y(t+ 1), Xi(t)) = 0.
By Assumptions 1 and 2, and Lemma 2 we have for t ≥ 0,
dist2 (y(t+ 1), C(v(t))) ≤ µ
n∑
i=1
dist2 (y(t+ 1), Xi(t)) .
By combining the preceding two relations we see that
lim
t→∞
dist2 (y(t+ 1), C(v(t))) = 0. (24)
By our assumption, we have that the event {v(t) =
vmax infinitely often} happens with probability 1. We now
fix a realization {vω(t)} of the sequence {v(t)} such that
vω(t) = v
max holds infinitely often (for infinitely many t’s).
Let {tk} be a sequence such that
vω(tk) = v
max for all k ≥ 0.
All the variables corresponding to the realization {vω(t)}
are denoted by a subscript ω. By relation (23) the sequence
{yω(t)} is bounded, therefore {yω(tk)} is bounded. Without
loss of generality (by passing to a subsequence of {tk}
if necessary), we assume that {yω(tk)} converges to some
vector y˜ω, i.e.,
lim
k→∞
yω(tk) = y˜ω.
Thus, the preceding two relations and Eq. (24) imply that
y˜ω ∈ C(v
max). Then, by relation (23), we have that
{‖yω(t)− y˜ω‖} is convergent, from which we conclude that
y˜ω must be the unique accumulation point of the sequence
{yω(t)}, i.e.,
lim
t→∞
yω(t) = y˜ω, y˜ω ∈ C(v
max).
This and the assumption Prob {v(t) = vmax i.o.} = 1,
imply that the sequence {y(t)} converges with probability 1
to a random point y˜ ∈ C(vmax). Since by Lemma 4 we
have ‖xi(t) − y(t)‖ → 0 for every i, it follows that the
sequences {xi(t)}, i = 1, . . . , n, converge with probability 1
to a common random point in the core C(vmax).
IV. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
In this section, we report some numerical simulations. We
consider a dynamic coalitional TU game with 3 players, so
the number of possible nonempty coalitions is m = 7. The
characteristic functions vS(t) are generated independently
with identical uniform distribution over an interval. Specifi-
cally, at each time t, the value v{1}(t) is chosen randomly in
the interval [4, 7] with uniform probability independently of
the other times. Similarly, the values v{2}(t) are generated
in the interval [0, 3]. The grand coalition value is fixed to 10
at all times, and the other coalition values are 0.
We run 50 different Monte Carlo trajectories each one
having 100 iterations. The number of iterations is chosen
long enough to show the convergence of the protocols. All
plots include the sampled average and sampled variance for
the 50 different trajectories that were simulated. Each trajec-
tory is generated by starting with the same initial allocations,
which are given by x1(0) = [10 0 0]′, x2(0) = [0 10 0]′,
and x3(0) = [0 0 10]′. The sampled average is computed for
each time t = 1, . . . , 100, by fixing the time t and computing
the average value of the 50 trajectory sample values for that
time. The sampled variance is computed as the variance of
the samples with respect to their sampled average.
v1
v2 v3
(a)
v1
v2 v3
(b)
v1
v2 v3
(c)
Fig. 1. Topology of players’ neighbor-graph at three distinct times
t = 0, 1 and 2.
Regarding the players’ neighbor-graphs, we assume that
the graphs are deterministic but time-varying. The graphs
for the times t = 0, 1, 2 are as follows: player 2 and 3
connected at time t = 0 (see Figure 1(a)), then player 3
and 1 connected at time t = 1 (Figure 1(b)), and finally
player 1 and 2 connected at time t = 3 (Figure 1(c)). These
graphs are then repeated consecutively in the same order. In
this way, the players’ neighbor-graph is connected every 2
time units (Assumption 4 is satisfied with Q = 2).
The matrices A(0), A(1) and A(2) that we associate with
these three graphs, are respectively given by:
 1 0 00 12 12
0 12
1
2

 ,

 12 0 120 1 0
1
2 0
1
2

 ,

 12 12 01
2
1
2 0
0 0 1

 .
These matrices are also repeated in the same order for the
rest of the time. Thus, at any time t, the matrix A(t) is
doubly stochastic, with positive diagonal, and every positive
entry bounded below by 12 , so Assumption 3 is satisfied with
α = 12 . All simulations are carried out with MATLAB on
an Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo, CPU P8400 at 2.27 GHz and
a 3GB of RAM. The run time of each simulation is around
90 seconds.
The characteristic function vmax for the robust game is
obtained by considering the highest possible coalition values
which results in vmax = [7 3 0 0 0 0 10]′. The resulting core
of the robust game is given by
C(vmax) = {x ∈ R3 : x1 ≥ 7, x2 ≥ 3, x3 ≥ 0,
x1 + x2 ≥ 0, x1 + x3 ≥ 0,
x2 + x3 ≥ 0, x1 + x2 + x3 = 10}.
We note that this core contains a single point, namely [7 3 0]′.
To ensure that v(t) = vmax infinitely often, as required
by Theorem 1 for the convergence of the protocol, we
adopt the following randomization mechanism. At each time
t = 1, . . . , 100, we flip a coin and if the outcome is “head”
(probability 1/2), the coalitions’ values v{1}(t) and v{2}(t)
are extracted from the intervals [4, 7] and [0, 3], respectively,
with uniform probability independently of the other times. If
the outcome of the coin flip is “tail”, then we assume that
the robust game realizes and take v(t) = vmax.
We next present the results obtained by the Monte Carlo
runs for the bargaining protocol in (15)–(17). An illustration
of a typical run with the allocations generated in periods
t = 0, 1, 2, 3 is shown below:
v(0) = [6.8 2.7 . . . 10]′
v(1) = [7 3 . . . 10]′
v(2) = [4.4 1.1 . . . 10]′
v(3) = [7 3 . . . 10]′
x1(0) = [10 0 0]′
x1(1) = [10 0 0]′
x1(2) = [5 2.5 2.5]′
x1(3) = [7 1.5 1.5]′
x2(0) = [0 10 0]′
x2(1) = [0 5 5]′
x2(2) = [0 5 5]′
x2(3) = [2.5 3.75 3.75]′
x3(0) = [0 0 10]′
x3(1) = [0 5 5]′
x3(2) = [5 2.5 2.5]′
x3(3) = [5 2.5 2.5]′.
Recall that the initial allocations of the players are x1(0) =
[10 0 0]′, x2(0) = [0 10 0]′, and x3(0) = [0 0 10]′. At
Fig. 2. Plots of the sampled average (left) and variance (right) of players’
allocations xi(t), i = 1, 2, 3 generated by bargaining protocol (15)–(17).
Sampled averages of the allocations xi(t) converge to the same point x˜ =
[7 3 0]′ ∈ C(vmax), while sampled variances go rapidly to zero.
time t = 1, bargaining involves player 2 and 3 who update
the allocations respectively as x2(1) = [0 5 5]′ and x3(1) =
[0 5 5]′. These allocations are feasible for their bounding sets
so the projections on these sets are not performed. At time
t = 2, the bargaining involves player 1 and 3 who update
their allocations, respectively, as x1(2) = [5 2.5 2.5]′ and
x3(2) = [5 2.5 2.5]′. Again, these allocations are feasible
for their bounding sets and the projections are not performed.
Finally, at time t = 3, the bargaining involves player 1 and 2
who update their allocations resulting in x1(3) = [7 1.5 1.5]′
and x2(3) = [2.5 3.75 3.75]′. Notice that x1(3) is obtained
after player 1 projects onto his bounding set.
In Figure 2 we report our simulation results for the average
of the sample trajectories obtained by Monte Carlo runs. We
show the sampled average and variance of the allocations
xi(t), i = 1, 2, 3 per iteration t. In accordance with the
convergence result of Theorem 1, the sampled averages of
the players’ allocations xi(t) converge to the same point,
namely x = [7 3 0]′ which is in the core of the robust game
C(vmax).
V. CONCLUSIONS
This article deals with dynamics and robustness within
the framework of coalitional TU games. The novelty of the
work lies in the design of a decentralized allocation process
defined over a communication graph of players. The key
properties that distinguish this work from the existing work
on dynamic games are: (1) the introduction of a time-varying
communication graph; and (2) the distributed bargaining
protocol for players’ allocations updates subject to local
information exchange with neighboring players.
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